Towards Resolving Unidentifiability in Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We consider a setting for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) where the learner is extended with the ability to actively select multiple environments, observing an agent's behavior on each environment. We first demonstrate that if the learner can experiment with any transition dynamics on some fixed set of states and actions, then there exists an algorithm that reconstructs the agent's reward function to the fullest extent theoretically possible, and that requires only a small (logarithmic) number of experiments. We contrast this result to what is known about IRL in single fixed environments, namely that the true reward function is fundamentally unidentifiable. We then extend this setting to the more realistic case where the learner may not select any transition dynamic, but rather is restricted to some fixed set of environments that it may try. We connect the problem of maximizing the information derived from experiments to submodular function maximization and demonstrate that a greedy algorithm is near optimal (up to logarithmic factors). Finally, we empirically validate our algorithm on an environment inspired by behavioral psychology

On the Complexity of Policy Iteration

Decision-making problems in uncertain or stochastic domains are often formulated as Markov decision processes (MDPs). Policy iteration (PI) is a popular algorithm for searching over policy-space, the size of which is exponential in the number of states. We are interested in bounds on the complexity of PI that do not depend on the value of the discount factor. In this paper we prove the first such non-trivial, worst-case, upper bounds on the number of iterations required by PI to converge to the optimal policy. Our analysis also sheds new light on the manner in which PI progresses through the space of policies.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1999

Learning to Make Predictions In Partially Observable Environments Without a Generative Model

When faced with the problem of learning a model of a high-dimensional environment, a common approach is to limit the model to make only a restricted set of predictions, thereby simplifying the learning problem. These partial models may be directly useful for making decisions or may be combined together to form a more complete, structured model. However, in partially observable (non-Markov) environments, standard model-learning methods learn generative models, i.e. models that provide a probability distribution over all possible futures (such as POMDPs). It is not straightforward to restrict such models to make only certain predictions, and doing so does not always simplify the learning problem. In this paper we present prediction profile models: non-generative partial models for partially observable systems that make only a given set of predictions, and are therefore far simpler than generative models in some cases. We formalize the problem of learning a prediction profile model as a transformation of the original model-learning problem, and show empirically that one can learn prediction profile models that make a small set of important predictions even in systems that are too complex for standard generative models

Approximate Planning for Factored POMDPs using Belief State Simplification

We are interested in the problem of planning for factored POMDPs. Building on the recent results of Kearns, Mansour and Ng, we provide a planning algorithm for factored POMDPs that exploits the accuracy-efficiency tradeoff in the belief state simplification introduced by Boyen and Koller.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1999

Repeated Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We introduce a novel repeated Inverse Reinforcement Learning problem: the agent has to act on behalf of a human in a sequence of tasks and wishes to minimize the number of tasks that it surprises the human by acting suboptimally with respect to how the human would have acted. Each time the human is surprised, the agent is provided a demonstration of the desired behavior by the human. We formalize this problem, including how the sequence of tasks is chosen, in a few different ways and provide some foundational results.Comment: The first two authors contributed equally to this work. The paper appears in NIPS 201

Value Prediction Network

This paper proposes a novel deep reinforcement learning (RL) architecture, called Value Prediction Network (VPN), which integrates model-free and model-based RL methods into a single neural network. In contrast to typical model-based RL methods, VPN learns a dynamics model whose abstract states are trained to make option-conditional predictions of future values (discounted sum of rewards) rather than of future observations. Our experimental results show that VPN has several advantages over both model-free and model-based baselines in a stochastic environment where careful planning is required but building an accurate observation-prediction model is difficult. Furthermore, VPN outperforms Deep Q-Network (DQN) on several Atari games even with short-lookahead planning, demonstrating its potential as a new way of learning a good state representation.Comment: NIPS 201

Predictive State Representations: A New Theory for Modeling Dynamical Systems

Modeling dynamical systems, both for control purposes and to make predictions about their behavior, is ubiquitous in science and engineering. Predictive state representations (PSRs) are a recently introduced class of models for discrete-time dynamical systems. The key idea behind PSRs and the closely related OOMs (Jaeger's observable operator models) is to represent the state of the system as a set of predictions of observable outcomes of experiments one can do in the system. This makes PSRs rather different from history-based models such as nth-order Markov models and hidden-state-based models such as HMMs and POMDPs. We introduce an interesting construct, the systemdynamics matrix, and show how PSRs can be derived simply from it. We also use this construct to show formally that PSRs are more general than both nth-order Markov models and HMMs/POMDPs. Finally, we discuss the main difference between PSRs and OOMs and conclude with directions for future work.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2004

Nash Convergence of Gradient Dynamics in Iterated General-Sum Games

Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of computationally simple agents an appealing direction. In this work, we analyze the behavior of agents that incrementally adapt their strategy through gradient ascent on expected payoff, in the simple setting of two-player, two-action, iterated general-sum games, and present a surprising result. We show that either the agents will converge to Nash equilibrium, or if the strategies themselves do not converge, then their average payoffs will nevertheless converge to the payoffs of a Nash equilibrium.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2000

Minimizing Maximum Regret in Commitment Constrained Sequential Decision Making

In cooperative multiagent planning, it can often be beneficial for an agent to make commitments about aspects of its behavior to others, allowing them in turn to plan their own behaviors without taking the agent's detailed behavior into account. Extending previous work in the Bayesian setting, we consider instead a worst-case setting in which the agent has a set of possible environments (MDPs) it could be in, and develop a commitment semantics that allows for probabilistic guarantees on the agent's behavior in any of the environments it could end up facing. Crucially, an agent receives observations (of reward and state transitions) that allow it to potentially eliminate possible environments and thus obtain higher utility by adapting its policy to the history of observations. We develop algorithms and provide theory and some preliminary empirical results showing that they ensure an agent meets its commitments with history-dependent policies while minimizing maximum regret over the possible environments

Fast Planning in Stochastic Games

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in stochastic games, the analogue of planning in MDPs. We begin by providing a generalization of finite-horizon value iteration that computes a Nash strategy for each player in generalsum stochastic games. The algorithm takes an arbitrary Nash selection function as input, which allows the translation of local choices between multiple Nash equilibria into the selection of a single global Nash equilibrium. Our main technical result is an algorithm for computing near-Nash equilibria in large or infinite state spaces. This algorithm builds on our finite-horizon value iteration algorithm, and adapts the sparse sampling methods of Kearns, Mansour and Ng (1999) to stochastic games. We conclude by descrbing a counterexample showing that infinite-horizon discounted value iteration, which was shown by shaplely to converge in the zero-sum case (a result we give extend slightly here), does not converge in the general-sum case.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2000